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The aim of the present study is twofold. First, we develop a theoretical model which 
incorporates the role of institutions in promoting economic growth. The theoretical model 
predicts that rent seeking activities decrease as institutional quality improves, and hence 
income increases and vice versa. Second, we conduct an empirical analysis to quantify the 
impact of institutions on economic growth in selected Asian economies over the period 1996-
2012 by employing both static and dynamic panel system Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) technique with fixed effects. The empirical results reveal that institutions indeed are 
important in determining the long run economic growth in Asian economies. However, the 
impact of institutions on economic growth differs across Asian economies and depends on the 
level of economic development. The results reveal that institutions are more effective in 
developed Asia than developing Asia. This evidence implies that different countries require 
different set of institutions to promote long term economic growth. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 The path breaking studies by North (1981), Jones (1987) and Olson (1982) 
inspired the researchers as well as policy-makers to investigate the impact of institutions 
on economic growth. Earlier empirical studies, inter alia by Knack and Keefer (1995), 
Mauro (1995) and Barro (1997) reveal that institutions are important for investment and 
long term sustainable growth. Hall and Jones (1999) demonstrate that differences in the 
institutions across the globe cause huge variations in capital accumulation, education 
attainment, and productivity growth, hence account for income disparities. More recently, 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) find that rule of law has a positive impact on 
economic growth. Similarly, Acemoglu, Cutler, Finkelstein, and Linn (2006) concluded 
that private property right institutions are the main drivers of long run economic growth, 
investment and financial development. These studies suggest that institutions are the 
fundamental determinants of the long run economic growth across countries.  
The existing literature primarily indicates a positive association between 
institutions and economic growth. However, institutions do not exert similar impact 
on economic growth across different set of countries. The positive contribution of 
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institutions is shaped by various factors like the perception of the individual about 
the institutions  and the social norms and community rules of a particular group of 
individuals. Sometimes institutions with similar characteristics produced extremely 
different outcomes across different groups, regions and societies. For example, in 
Latin American countries  similar laws and solutions were adopted  to achieve 
different levels of economic growth and development [Yifu Lin and Nugent (1995)]. 
In this context, Alonso and Garcimartín (2013) signify the role of stages of economic 
development in determining the growth effects of institutions and found that level of 
development determines the quality of institutions which, in turn, enhances  higher 
economic growth.   
Few studies have empirically investigated the growth effects of institutions at 
various stages of development [Nawaz (2014); Valeriani and Peluso (2011)]. These 
studies have shown that the impact of institutions on economic growth is different across 
countries. These studies conclude that institutions perform better in developed countries 
as compared to developing ones. A study on transitional economies shows that control 
over corruption is growth enhancing if complemented by strong democratic institutions 
not necessarily otherwise. Institutional measures promote economic growth in strongly 
democratic economies and fail to boost growth in weakly democratic countries [Iqbal and 
Daly (2014)]. However, these studies lack a theoretical foundation to capture the linkages 
between institutions and economic growth, and also suffered from possible endogeneity 
problem. It can be argued that theoretical foundation is essential to understand the 
mechanism though which institutions are linked with economic growth. Furthermore, 
controlling endogeneity is important for reliable and robust empirical findings. Nawaz 
(2014) has investigated the impact of different institutions on economic growth assuming 
different stages of development using the SYS-GMM estimation technique.  However, 
this study fails to control the possibility of heterogeneity by combining different countries 
into one group.  The present study fills that gap in literature after taking care of above 
mentioned shortcomings.  
The main objective of this study is to develop theoretical model that incorporates 
the role of institutions with respect to economic growth. Furthermore, the present study 
empirically estimates the impact of various institutions on economic growth at the cross-
country level. Particularly, we examine the impact of institutions on economic growth by 
classifying developed and developing Asian economies over the period 1996-2012. This 
study contributes  to the existing literature  in various ways. First, this study develops a 
theoretical model by incorporating the role of institutions on economic growth following 
Gradstein (2007) and Chong and Gradstein (2007). Second, this study addresses the 
issues of heterogeneity and endogeneity using the SYS-GMM estimation technique. 
Third, this study develops institutional quality index to capture different dimensions of 
the institutions. Fourth, this study quantifies the impact of institutions at different stages 
of development.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides theoretical 
framework based on extended version of the endogenous growth theory to incorporate the 
impact of institutions on economic growth. Section 3 explains the data sources, and 
outlines estimation methodology.  The empirical results and discussion are presented in 
section, while conclusion and policy implications are given in Section 5.  
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2.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Traditional economic growth theories postulate that level of output per capita is 
determined by the amount of physical and human capital and level of technology in a 
country. In the production process, economic growth is linked with the ability of the 
nation to enhance its physical and human capital along with the technological 
developments. Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) however, state that: 
“[The] differences in human capital, physical capital, and technology are only 
proximate causes in the sense that they pose the next question of why some 
countries have less human capital, physical capital, and technology and make 
worse use of their factors and opportunities. To develop more satisfactory answer 
to question of why some countries are much richer than others and why some 
countries grow much faster than others, we need to look for potential fundamental 
causes, which may be underlying these proximate differences across 
countries”[p.2] 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) argue that institutions are the fundamental 
determinant of economic growth and cause development differences across countries. 
North (1981) defines institutions as the rule of the game in a society or, more formally 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. This means that 
institutions shape the incentive structure in the society that may increase or hamper the 
economic activities. Poor quality institutions may slow down the economic activities by 
providing room to economic agents to remain busy in redistributive politics with lower 
economic returns rather than growth promoting economic activities [Murphy, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1993)]. On the other hand, good quality institutions may promote incentive 
structure that leads to higher economic growth through reducing uncertainty and 
promoting efficiency [North (1990)].  Hall and Jones (1999) argued that overall 
productivity of factors of production in a country is driven by the quality of its 
institutions. Efficient, well developed and uncorrupt institutions guarantee that labour can 
only be used for productive purposes and not wasted in rent seeking activities,  which 
leads to higher economic growth [North (1990)]. Good quality institutions enhance the 
ability of a country  to adopt new technologies invented elsewhere which may play an 
important role in upgrading the development process of a country  [Bernard and Jones 
(1996)].  
Iqbal and Daly (2014) argue that weak institutions divert resources from 
productive sector to unproductive sector hence promote rent seeking activities. While, 
strong institutions reduce the chances of rent seeking activities and accelerate economic 
growth process and productivity of the reproducible factors. This study argues that weak 
institutional framework creates an opportunity for rent seeking behaviour that may divert 
resources to unproductive sectors.1 The consequences of these activities for growth can 
be negative: resources may not be efficiently allocated, externalities may be ignored, 
transaction costs may be increased. North (1990) argues that institutional weaknesses 
 
1
Rent seeking  activity is defined as  an activity through which public power is exercised for private 
gain; this may involve misuse of public resources or, more generally, any attempted capture and 
commodification of state, social or commercial authority by politicians, public officials, elites and private 
interests [Iqbal and Daly (2014)].  
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lead to rent seeking activities hence low development. The incomplete rule of law, non-
enforcement of property rights, inadequate policies and the lack of reliable infrastructure 
constitute a weak institutional framework that may promote rent seeking activities [Iqbal 
and Daly (2014)].  
To put the above discussion in a framework, we use the endogenous growth 
model. Following the Gradstein (2007) and Chong and Gradstein (2007), we specify 
Cobb Douglas type production function of the following form:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝛼  … … … … … … … (1) 
where 𝑦 is output per worker, 𝑘 is the stock of physical capital per worker which includes 
both private and public capitals, 𝐴>0 represents total factor productivity. Countries are 
indexed by 𝑖 and 𝑡  represents time period, 𝛼 is the elasticity of output per worker with 
respect to physical capital per worker and 0 < 𝛼 < 1. To incorporate the role of 
institutions in promoting economic growth, we modify the basic endogenous growth 
model. The above discussion reveals that weak (strong) institutions divert resources to 
unproductive (productive) sectors hence cause low (high) development. Gradstein (2007) 
and Chong and Gradstein (2007) also argued that weak institutions divert resources from 
productive sectors to unproductive sectors and promote rent seeking activities. However, 
strong institutions reduce the chances of rent seeking activities and accelerate economic 
growth and productivity of the reproducible factors. To capture this notion, we redefine 
production function specified in Equation (1) by including rent-seeking activities that act 
as a distortion in the production process. Now the production function takes the following 
form:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡)𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝛼   … … … … … … (2) 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∈ [0, ?̂?], ?̂? ≪ 1 indicate rent seeking activities. ?̂? is a ppoint at which 
institutional quality is degraded to such an extent that the modeling framework ceases to 
apply. Assume that appropriate share of rent-seeking by each firm depends on the amount 
of rent seeking and quality of institutions. With strong institutions, the value of rent 
seeking 𝑟𝑖𝑡   is close to 0, whereas with weak institutions the value of 𝑟𝑖𝑡  is close to 1 and 
the marginal utility of rent-seeking is maximal.  Higher marginal utility of 𝑟𝑖𝑡  implies 
weak institutions and hence low productivity of factors of production and vice versa. This 
augmentation provides meaningful explanation about the cross country differences in 
long run growth rates.2  Thus 𝑟𝑖𝑡  reduces the marginal product of reproducible factors due 
to economic distortions resulting from low quality institutions. To determine the long run 
growth patterns across countries, we need to examine the consumption and investment 
decisions made by the individuals. Consider one representative agent facing an infinite 
planning horizon and maximising intertemporal utility subject to dynamic budget 








 … … … … … … (3) 
 
2
Steger (2000) introduces the similar index (distortion index in the production function to capture the 
role of detrimental government policies on economic growth. Iqbal (2013) incorporates instability index in the 
model using similar formulation to capture the impact on macroeconomic instability due to weak institutions 
and macroeconomic policies on output.  
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where 𝑐𝑖𝑡  represents private consumption in per capita form and σ > 0 and σ ≠ 1 which 
shows that the elasticity of marginal utility equals the constant −σ.  The other 
multiplier, 𝑒−𝜌𝑡, involves the rate of time preference, 𝜌 > 0. Positive time preferences 
rate 𝜌 means so that utils are valued less the later they are received. The dynamic budget 




= (1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡)𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝛼 − 𝑐𝑖𝑡  … … … … … (4) 
It is assumed that the initial capital stock at time 0 is 1 i.e. 𝑘(0) = 1. The terminal 
condition is defined as lim𝑡→∞ 𝑘𝜆𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 = 0   which indicates that the capital stock left 
over the end of the planning horizon, when discounted at the time discount rate is zero. 
This restriction rules out the type of chain-letter finance. Equation (4) suggests that 
increase in the capital stock equals the total saving, which in turn, equals to the difference 
between output and consumption. The individual chooses optimal consumption {𝑐𝑖𝑡: 𝑡 ≥
0} and investment path to determine the level of capital stock {𝑘𝑖𝑡: 𝑡 ≥ 0}. To find this 





𝑒−𝜌𝑡 + 𝜆[(1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡)𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝛼 − 𝑐𝑖𝑡] … … … … (5) 
The expression within  bracket is equal to ?̇? and 𝜆 is Lagrange multiplier 
representing the present value of shadow price of income.  Differentiation of Lagrange 




= 0 ⇒ 𝑐𝑖𝑡
1−𝜎𝑒−𝜌𝑡 − 𝜆 = 0  … … … … … (6) 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑘𝑖𝑡
+ ?̇? = 0 ⇒ 𝜆(1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡)𝐴𝛼𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝛼−1 = −?̇? … … … … (7) 
Using first-order conditions; fixing the initial capital stock 𝑘(0) = 1; applying 
transversality condition  lim𝑡→∞ 𝑘𝑡𝜆𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 = 0; the budget constraint is given in Equation 
(4), we find the growth rate of per capita consumption which is the same as the capital 























 … … … … … (9) 
Equation (8) shows that as institutional quality improves, the rent seeking 
activities decrease and hence consumption (or income) increases. Now differentiating 










> 0. This shows that as the value of itr  
increases,  the output decreases as 𝜎 > 0.  
Propositions: The larger the 𝑟𝑖𝑡 , the lower will be the growth rate of the economy 
and vice versa. As  institutional quality improves, the rent seeking activities decrease and 
hence consumption/income increases and vice versa. 
We consider two cases for example for validation, these include:  
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(i) When  𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 0 (strong institutions): Under strong institutions regime,  




𝛼−1 − 𝜌]  
(ii) When 0 < 𝑟𝑖𝑡 < ?̂? (weak institutions): Under weak institutions regime,  




𝛼−1 − 𝜌] 
In essence, the theoretical model highlights that long run growth rate of per capita 
output is a function of physical capital and rent seeking—a proxy for institutions. After 
logarithmic transformation, Equation (9) can be rewritten as: 
?̇?𝑖𝑡 = α0 + φI𝑖𝑡 + θk𝑖𝑡  … … … … … (9) 
where ?̇?𝑖𝑡 represents GDP growth rate across cross-section 𝑖 at time period 𝑡. 𝐼𝑖𝑡 
represents institutional quality index and k𝑖𝑡  indicates physical capital. We use Equation 
(10) to examine the impact of institutions on economic growth.  
 
3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
To determine the impact of institutions on growth, we employ a panel data set of 
35 Asian countries over the period 1996-2012.3 The selected countries  are divided into 
developed Asia and developing Asia on the basis of   income levels following the World 
Bank classification.4 The data on the institutional variables are collected from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) published by the World Bank. The database 
provides six different measures capturing different dimensions of the institutional 
framework. These indicators include: (i) control of corruption, (ii) government 
effectiveness, (iii) political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, (iv) regulatory 
quality, (v) rule of law, and (vi) voice and accountability. The indicator ranges from –2.5 
to +2.5. The low value indicates bad quality institutions and vice versa.  
It is expected that these indicators are likely to be correlated, therefore, we 
construct institutional quality index using the Principle Component Method (PCM) 
methodology. The PCM indicates how much variance of a variable is explained by a 
specific principal component. The principal component is derived by computing the 
eigenvalues of the sample covariance matrix. These eigenvalues are the variances of the 
variables (institutional indicators in this case). Therefore, the number of principal 
components is equal to the number of variables. Typically most of the variance is 
explained by the first principal component and therefore its value is used for computation 
of the index. The main advantage of PCM is that the weights to be assigned to the 
variables are determined by the data itself. The Figure 1 depicts the average quality of 
institutions across full sample, developing Asia and developed Asia. The average value of 
institutional quality index across the full sample is 4.5, while this value is 5.8, 3.0 for 
developed Asia and developing Asian countries respectively during the period 1996-
2012. The individual indicators also show similar behaviour. 
 
3
The choice of 35 countries is mainly based on the availability of data on all variables. 
4
The World Bank classifies the countries on the basis of income per capita. The sub-groups are: (i) Low 
income countries/Developing countries and (ii) High income countries/Developed countries. In developing 
countries sub-group, we have  selected 16 countries, while in developed countries sub-group we have selected 
19 countries. 
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Fig. 1.  Average Quality of Institutions across Full Sample, Developing  
Asia and Developed Asia 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. We normalised the values between the ranges of 1 to 10. 1 implies low 
quality of institutions and 10 means high quality of institutions.  
 
The data on all economic variables are taken from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) published by the World Bank. These variables include GDP per capita 
growth, investment, trade openness, inflation and the government size. Investment is 
measured as the Gross Fixed Capital Formation as a percent of GDP. Openness is the 
sum of exports and imports divided by the GDP. Inflation is measured by the log 
difference of consumer price index (CPI). We use general government final consumption 
expenditure relative to GDP as a proxy for the government size. The descriptive statistics 
(Table 1A appendix) show that the annual average GDP per capita growth rate is 3.7 over 
the period 1996-2012. The annual average investment as percent of GDP is 24 over the 
same period. The annual average inflation across the full sample is 7.15, while annual 
average inflation is relatively high in developed countries (5.35) as compared to 
developing countries (9.29) over the period 1996-2012. The average government size as 
percent of GDP is 13 over the same period.  
The model described in previous section emphasises the role of institutions as 
determinants of output per capita. Based on the theoretical framework an empirical model 
can be written as: 
?̇?𝑖𝑡 = α0 + φI𝑖𝑡 + θk𝑖𝑡 + βX + εit … … … … (11) 
where ?̇?𝑖𝑡  represent GDP growth rate of country 𝑖 at time period 𝑡. 𝐼𝑖𝑡 represents 
institutional quality index (INS Index) and k𝑖𝑡  indicates physical capital, and X is the set 
of control variables, while εit is the disturbance term which is assumed to be serially 
uncorrelated and orthogonal to the explanatory variables. The vector of control variables 
X includes: investment (INV), government size (EXP), inflation (INF) and trade openness 
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identified by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Levine and Renelt (1992) and Barro and 
Lee (1996).  
The choice of appropriate estimation technique is important for obtaining robust 
estimates. To measure the impact of institutions on economic growth we, employ panel 
data estimation technique. The panel data estimation technique is considered as an 
efficient analytical method, since it allows combining different cross sections and time 
periods, and provides more reliable and robust inference. We use the Fixed Effects Model 
(FEM) based on the Hausman test. Before proceeding further, it is important to highlight 
the possibility of endogeneity between institutions and economic growth. Acemoglu, 
Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2009) conclude that traditional empirical literature 
generally carries problems like endogeneity, measurement errors and omitted variables 
bias.  
A popular method to tackle the endogeneity is the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM). The GMM estimator is as an extension of Instrumental Variable (IV) 
methodology. The main advantage of GMM estimation is that the model need not be 
homoscedastic and serially independent. Another advantage of the GMM estimation is 
that it finds the parameters estimates by maximising an objective function which includes 
the moment restriction that the correlation between error term and lagged regressor is 
zero. In essence, the GMM takes into account the time series dimension of the data, non-
observable country specific effects, inclusion of lagged dependent variables among the 
explanatory variables and the possibility that all explanatory variables are endogenous 
[Bond, Bowsher, and Windmeijer (2001); Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996)]. In 
particular, the system GMM, developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) and applied by Bond, et al. (2001) to the growth equation, was found to 
reduce a small sample bias that characterises the first differenced GMM used by Caselli, 
et al. (1996).  
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose a strategy to choose instruments to solve the 
endogeneity.  This study suggests transforming to first differences to eliminate the time-
invariant fixed effects and applying IV with lagged difference or level as instruments. 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator is an example of simple IV estimation, in which 
there is one instrument for each endogenous variable. A simple generalisation of this 
estimator is the GMM in which the number of instruments is permitted to exceed the 
number of endogenous variables. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using all valid lags 
of all the regressors as instruments. The efficiency of GMM estimation  generally 
increases in the number of valid and effective moment conditions. Therefore, Arellano 
and Bond (1991) estimator should be superior to Anderson and Hsiao (1982)  estimator. 
However, this superiority might be minimal if the panel has a shorter time span. Given 
that our data span over 30 years, there is limited opportunity for applying the Arellano 
and Bond (1991)  instrumentation method. To solve this problem, Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), assuming stationarity justify additional zero-
moment restrictions that can be applied to a model in levels, instrumented with lagged 
differences. These additional moment restrictions can be combined with those in Arellano 
and Bond (1991) to provide a “system-GMM” estimator in which GMM is applied to a 
system of two equations: an equation in difference form instrumented by lagged levels, 
and an equation in levels instrumented by lagged difference.  
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For lagged endogenous variables and weakly exogenous variables to be valid as 
instruments, it is necessary that the transient disturbances are free of autocorrelation in 
the basic model [Blundell and Bond (1998)]. This implies that disturbances in the 
differenced model have significant first-order correlation and insignificant second-order 
autocorrelation. For this purpose, the Arellano-Bond tests for first-order and second-order 
serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals are used [Arellano and Bond (1991)]. 
As the first difference of independently and identically distributed idiosyncratic error will 
be serially correlated, rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-
differenced error at order one does not imply that model is misspecified. Rejecting the 
null hypothesis at higher orders, however, implies that the moment conditions are not 
valid. Therefore, to establish the robustness of the estimates, we employ SYS-GMM. 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We have estimated equation (10) to examine the impact of institutions on 
economic growth for a panel of 35 Asian countries over the period 1996-2012 using the 
Fixed Effects Model. The estimation results are presented in Table 2. The estimation has 
been carried out separately for the whole panel of countries as well as for the developed 
and developing Asian economies. We have used various diagnostics to ensure the 
adequacy of the estimated models. The results of diagnostics are reported below in  Table 
2. These results confirm that the estimated models are well specified.  
As shown in Table 2 that institutions have a positive impact on economic growth 
in Asian countries which implies that institutions are growth enhancing. The value of 
estimated coefficient of institutions is 0.7 and significant at the 5 percent level of 
significance. This implies that an increase in institutional quality by 1 percentage points 
increases the long term economic growth rate by 0.7 percentage points. This result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that institutions play a critical role in the growth process. 
For example, North (1990) argues that institutions increase the productivity of factor 
inputs by improving the incentive structure. Similarly, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 
and Yared (2008) showed that good quality institutions enhance a country’s ability to 
utilise modern technologies which, in turn causes economic growth. Many other 
empirical studies provide evidence that institutions promote economic growth 
[Acemoglu, et al. (2006); Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001); Barro (1997); Hall 
and Jones (1999); Iqbal and Daly (2014); Knack and Keefer (1995)].  
To examine the role of institutions on economic growth at various stages of 
economic development, we have disaggregated our sample into developed Asia and 
developing Asia. We find that the impact of institutions on economic growth is positive 
for both developed as well as developing Asia. However, the contribution of institutions 
to economic growth is relatively high in developed Asian countries than in developing 
Asian countries. The value of estimated coefficient of institution index is 0.4 for 
developing Asian countries, while it is 1.17 for developed Asian economies. This shows 
that a one percentage point improvement in the quality of institution leads to 0.4 
percentage point increase in GDP per capita in the developing Asian economies and 1.17 
percentage point increase in GDP per capita in the developed Asian countries. The low 
contribution of institutions to economic growth in developing Asian nations could be 
attributed  to several reasons. One reason could be that the political system in these 
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countries is weak. The politicians and public officials have fewer checks on their power, 
making it easier for them to engage in rent seeking. This inefficiency may act as binding 
constraint in making institutions growth enhancing. Various studies have shown that 
under weak democracy, institutions may not work effectively [Aidt, Dutta, and Sena 
(2008); Drury, Krieckhaus, and Lusztig (2006); Iqbal and Daly (2014); Méndez and 
Sepúlveda (2006)]. Iqbal and Daly (2014) find that corruption has an insignificant impact 
on economic growth under weak democracy. Other reason could be that the institutional 
framework in developing countries is still underdeveloped and in the transition stage. 
This transition process undermines the effectiveness of institutions. For example, 
frequent changes in the design of institutional framework are not effective to promote 
economic growth. Another reason could be that the quality of institutions could be below 
the certain minimum threshold level. Zhuang, De Dios, and Lagman-Martin (2010) argue 
that institutions are only effective when they are above the world average values. 
Economies with strong institutions show higher growth than those with institutions below 
threshold level. Finally, causality between institutional quality and economic growth also 
explains different impacts on institutions in developed and developing countries 
[Fukuyama and McFaul (2008)].  
 
Table 2 
Impact of Institutions on Economic Growth (Institutional Quality Index) 
Variables Asia Developing Asia Developed Asia 
INS Index 0.702 0.406 1.172 
 (0.30)** (0.21)* (0.48)** 
EXP –0.369 –0.441 –0.300 
 (0.08)*** (0.14)*** (0.11)*** 
INV 0.087 0.191 0.031 
 (0.03)*** (0.05)*** (0.05) 
OPN 0.034 –0.001 0.041 
 (0.01)*** (0.02) (0.01)*** 
INF –0.037 –0.025 –0.028 
 (0.02)** (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant 0.259 3.707 -4.591 
 (1.91) (2.02)* (3.50) 
Observations 595 272 323 
R-squared 0.083 0.106 0.102 
F-values  10.10 5.97 6.78 
Hausman test 29.83 (0.00) 25.37 (0.00) 33.62 (0.00) 
Number of Countries 35 16 19 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Numerous control variables have been used in the empirical analysis. For example, 
our results show that the impact of government size measured by government 
consumption is negative on economic growth for the whole Asian countries, developing 
Asia and developed Asia. Our results are consistent with earlier studies that government 
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size has a negative impact on economic growth [Agell, Lindh, and Ohlsson (1997); Barro 
(1991); Bergh and Karlsson (2010); Cameron (1982); Grier and Tullock (1989); Landau 
(1983); Marlow (1986); Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008); Saunders (1986)]. The results 
show that the impact of investment on economic growth is positive. This finding is in line 
with existing literature [Barro (1991); Rebelo (1991)]. Inflation has a negative association 
with growth in GDP per capita, implying that inflation hurts the growth process. Many 
empirical studies have found similar results [Fischer (1993); Sirimaneetham and Temple 
(2009)]. Higher inflation produces detrimental impact on the economic growth. This 
result could be justified in many ways. It causes reduction in investment and productivity 
by generating uncertainty in the economy [Fischer (1993)] and produces adverse effects 
on the productivity of inputs through distorting the price mechanism [Smyth (1995)]. 
High inflation also increases the risk premium and hinders the smooth functioning of 
financial markets through the reduction of saving and investment. Trade openness has a 
positive and significant impact on the economic growth, implying that trade is beneficial 
for economic growth. The positive association of trade openness and economic growth is 
due to the benefits emerging from specialisation, competition and economies of scale. 
This result is consistent with the earlier studies [Balassa (1978); Din, Ghani, and 
Siddique (2003); Edwards (1998); Sachs, Warner, Åslund, and Fischer (1995); Tyler 
(1981)].  
 
4.1.  Institutions and Growth: A Disaggregated Analysis 
In the previous analysis we used a composite index of institutional quality to 
quantify the impact of institutions on economic growth. We concluded that institutions 
perform better in developed Asian economies as compared to developing economies. 
However, this provides a limited picture in explaining the influence of institutions on 
growth assuming different stages of development. The findings based on composite 
institutional quality index do not  identify  the effect of individual components of 
institutional quality. Zhuang, et al. (2010) have pointed out that various components of 
institutional quality have differential effects on growth, depending on a country’s history, 
stages of development, and the length of time horizon being investigated.  Following 
Zhuang, et al. (2010) we have investigated the impact of various components of 
institutional quality on economic growth. Table 3 reports the results.5  
The disaggregated analysis has shown that control over corruption (CC), 
government effectiveness (GE) and rule of law (RL) are more important as compared 
to political stability (PS), regulatory quality (RQ) and voice and accountability (VA) 
in the full sample of Asian countries. Further, we have found that different 
institutions perform differently for developed and developing Asia. For Asian 
developing economies, the government effectiveness and rule of law play significant 
role in promoting economic growth. On the other hand, all most all measures of 
institutional quality contribute significantly to economic growth. These findings 
support the Zhuang, et al. (2010) view that different institutions perform differently 
at different stages of development.  
 
5
We have also used other control variables in the estimation, but for presentation purposes we have 
omitted these variables from the Table. The detailed estimation Tables are available upon the request from 
authors. 
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Table 3 
Impact of Institutions on Economic Growth (Components of Institutional Quality) 
Variable CC GE PS RL RQ VA 
Full Sample 0.762 1.497 0.245 0.832 0.779 0.411 
 (0.41)* (0.49)*** (0.25) (0.48)* (0.43)* (0.44) 
Developing 0.620 1.194 0.292 0.682 -0.699 0.920 
 (0.56) (0.68)* (0.31) (0.41)* (0.57) (0.57) 
Developed 1.095 2.099 0.140 1.428 3.041 0.173 
 (0.63)* (0.78)*** (0.42) (0.74)* (0.72)*** (0.66) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
4.2.  Sensitivity Analysis  
To examine the issue of reverse causality between institutions quality and 
economic growth, we re-estimate the model after controlling the possibility of 
reverse causality and endogeneity using dynamic system GMM (SYS-GMM).  The 
SYS-GMM uses lag of dependent variables to introduce dynamics in the model. The 
inclusion of lagged dependent variable allows for path dependency in the model and 
works as a partial adjustment mechanism. Lagged level of per capita GDP is taken to 
test the neo-classical hypothesis of convergence to a long run steady state. The 
results are presented in the Table 4. A battery of diagnostic tests have been applied to 
check the accuracy of the specification and to ensure that the models are adequately 
specified. Chi-square statistic confirms the adequacy of the estimated models. 
Diagnostic statistics based on AR1 and AR2 are consistent with the validity of 
instruments used in SYS-GMM.  
The results show that institutions have a positive impact on economic growth in a 
sample of 35 Asian countries as well as for developed and developing Asian countries. 
We found that institutions perform relatively better in developed Asian countries as 
compared to developing Asian countries as indicated by the size of the coefficient. The 
estimated impact of institutions is high in developed Asian countries than developing 
Asia. The impact of control variables remains the same as we found in case of fixed 
effects estimation.  
As shown in Table 4 the negative coefficient  of the lagged level of GDP per 
capita (GDPPC(-1)) together with positive coefficient  of the lagged growth rates 
(GDPPCG(-1)), support the neoclassical hypothesis of convergence to a long run 
steady state in the case of full sample. The impact of individual indicators of 
institutions on economic growth is also estimated using the SYS-GMM method 
(Table 5). The results suggest that different institutions perform differently at 
different stages of development. The results are similar to those found in case of 
fixed effects estimation. The results suggest that control of corruption, government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality have relatively greater effect on economic 
growth in developed Asia as compared to developing Asia. On the other hand, rule of 
law and voice and accountability perform better in developing Asia than in 
developed Asian nations.  
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Table 4 
SYS-GMM (Results of Institutional and Economic Growth) 
Variables Asia Developing Asia Developed Asia 
INS Index 1.304 1.568 1.992 
 (0.36)*** (0.51)*** (0.36)*** 
EXP –0.259 –0.210 –0.225 
 (0.10)** (0.14) (0.11)** 
INV 0.024 0.244 –0.096 
 (0.04) (0.06)*** (0.06)* 
INF –0.109 –0.065 –0.207 
 (0.03)*** (0.03)** (0.05)*** 
GDPPC(–1) –2.870 –2.748 –5.050 
 (0.58)*** (1.00)*** (0.89)*** 
GDPPCG(–1) 0.096 -0.104 0.226 
 (0.03)*** (0.05)** (0.04)*** 
Constant 24.047 15.183 49.023 
 (4.07)*** (5.48)*** (8.10)*** 
Observations 560 256 304 
Number of Countries 35 16 19 
Wald Chi2 Value 60.72 36.16 83.60 
AR1 Test 0.0018 0.0396 0.0042 
AR2 Test 0.1729 0.1140 0.1645 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 5 
SYS-GMM (Components of Institutional Quality) 
Variable CC GE PS RL RQ VA 
Full Sample 1.570 2.728 0.142 2.465 2.308 1.239 
 (0.46)*** (0.55)*** (0.38) (0.57)*** (0.55)*** (0.51)** 
Developing 2.287 2.336 0.446 3.645 0.144 2.310 
 (0.68)*** (0.79)*** (0.42) (0.88)*** (0.67) (0.74)*** 
Developed 2.932 2.370 –0.134 2.406 2.832 0.875 
 (0.52)*** (0.62)*** (0.43) (0.59)*** (0.66)*** (0.51)* 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study develops a theoretical model and assesses the role of institutions on 
economic growth for a panel of 35 Asian countries over the period 1996-2012. We have 
used the fixed effects and SYS-GMM estimation techniques to examine the impact of 
different institutions including: control over corruption, government effectiveness, 
political stability, rule of law, regulatory quality and voice and accountability on 
economic growth. We have constructed institutional quality index using six component 
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institutions by employing principle component method. The theoretical model reveals 
that as institutional quality improves, the rent seeking activities decrease and hence 
income increases and vice versa. The empirical results support the hypothesis that 
institutions exert positive impact on economic growth. Our findings suggest that control 
of corruption and maintenance of rule of law are the key determinants of long term 
economic growth for sampled Asian countries. Furthermore, results reveal that the impact 
of institutions on economic growth varies across Asian countries depending on the stages 
of economic development. The estimated impact of institutions on economic growth is 
relatively higher in the developed Asia than in the developing Asian countries. This result 
highlights the role of institutions and level of economic development in determining the 
long run economic growth. Therefore, different countries require different set of 
institutions and policies to promote long run economic growth.  
 
Appendix Table 1A 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
 
Full Sample 
GDP Per Capita Growth Rate 595 3.70 4.84 –14.39 38.06 
Investment (INV) 595 24.14 8.33 8.01 64.43 
Government size (EXP) 595 13.59 5.62 3.46 30.50 
Inflation (INF) 595 7.15 11.33 –8.53 128.42 
Openness (OPN) 595 101.95 75.89 18.76 448.31 
Institutions (INS Index) 595 –0.14 0.70 –1.45 1.44 
Control of Corruption (CC) 595 –0.10 0.86 –1.49 2.42 
Government Effectiveness (GE) 595 0.09 0.80 –1.28 2.43 
Political Stability (PS) 595 –0.35 0.92 –2.50 1.40 
Rule of Law (RL) 595 –0.05 0.79 –1.52 1.77 
Regulatory Quality (RQ) 595 0.06 0.82 –1.73 2.25 
Voice and Accountability (VA) 595 –0.44 0.72 –1.86 1.14 
 
Low Income/Developing Countries 
GDP Per Capita Growth Rate 272 4.38 4.26 –14.39 38.06 
Investment (INV) 272 24.59 9.18 8.01 64.43 
Government Size (EXP) 272 11.21 4.68 3.46 25.88 
Inflation (INF) 272 9.29 11.43 –1.71 128.42 
Openness (OPN) 272 76.66 31.42 21.55 162.91 
Institutions (INS Index) 272 –0.57 0.38 –1.45 0.29 
Control of Corruption (CC) 272 –0.62 0.47 –1.49 0.82 
Government Effectiveness (GE) 272 –0.42 0.40 –1.28 0.78 
Political Stability (PS) 272 –0.79 0.87 –2.50 1.31 
Rule of Law (RL) 272 –0.57 0.48 –1.52 0.37 
Regulatory Quality (RQ) 272 –0.44 0.40 –1.50 0.68 
Voice and Accountability (VA) 272 –0.59 0.56 –1.82 0.50 
 
High Income/Developed Countries 
GDP Per Capita Growth Rate 323 3.12 5.21 –11.53 33.03 
Investment (INV) 323 23.76 7.54 9.66 57.71 
Government Size (EXP) 323 15.59 5.57 6.77 30.50 
Inflation (INF) 323 5.35 10.93 –8.53 85.73 
Openness (OPN) 323 123.25 93.80 18.76 448.31 
Institutions (INS Index) 323 0.22 0.71 –1.24 1.44 
Control of Corruption (CC) 323 0.33 0.88 –1.25 2.42 
Government Effectiveness (GE) 323 0.53 0.80 –1.07 2.43 
Political Stability (PS) 323 0.03 0.78 –1.62 1.40 
Rule of Law (RL) 323 0.38 0.73 –1.19 1.77 
Regulatory Quality (RQ) 323 0.48 0.85 –1.73 2.25 
Voice and Accountability (VA) 323 –0.31 0.82 -1.86 1.14 
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